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 Abstract
 
 The special status, large sizes, and recent rapid growth of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have 
created and/or contributed to a set of difficult policy problems that include: misguided and excessive 
subsidization of housing in the U.S.; the safety and soundness of the two companies; systemic risk; 
residential mortgage terms and structure; and the inherent efficiencies of the two companies.  The 
two companies are embedded in a much larger web of policies that broadly and inefficiently 
encourage housing construction and consumption.  The true privatization of the two companies is 
the best solution to the problems that specifically involve them and would constitute a good start 
toward correcting the excesses of American housing policy.  This true privatization can be 
accomplished in a relatively clean and straightforward fashion. 
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 I. Introduction
 
 The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) are the two extremely large companies that are at the center of 
the residential mortgage finance system of the United States.  They are similar in size, function, 
purpose -- and controversy.  Two years ago Freddie Mac experienced major accounting problems 
that eventually led to a wholesale change of top management.  This past fall Fannie Mae 
experienced major accounting problems that led also to a wholesale change of its top management. 
 The controversies that surround these two organizations are not accidental.  Their special 
hybrid (quasi-governmental) form, large sizes, rapid recent growth rates, and dominance of 
residential mortgage finance have placed them in the policy spotlight, and this public scrutiny is 
unlikely to disappear any time soon. 
 The focus of the current policy attention that is being paid to these two companies is largely 
centered on reforming the regulatory structure and processes that surround them.  But these reform 
efforts are, at best, a second-best approach.  Instead, a better policy focus would be to remove all of 
the quasi-governmental features that make the two companies special -- i.e., truly privatizing them.  
Thus, the goal would be to allow them to function as effectively as their inherent organizational 
strengths and skills would permit – but without any of the special quasi-governmental features that 
give them special advantages as compared with other companies. 
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 This paper will offer the reasons why this goal is worthwhile and a straightforward way that 
it can be achieved.1  Section II provides a brief review of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and their 
special features.  Section III will outline the major policy problems that follow from their special 
status.  Section IV will offer a straightforward plan for privatizing the two companies.  Section V 
provides a brief conclusion. 
    1 This paper draws heavily on White (2003, 2004) and Frame and White (2004, 2005).  Further 
details, summaries of the controversies, and back-up references for the points and arguments that are 
developed in this paper can be found in those studies. 
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II. Fannie and Freddie: A Brief Overview
 
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are the fourth and fifth largest companies in the U.S., when 
measured by assets, as of the end of 2004.  They each operate two related lines of business:  They 
issue and guarantee mortgage-backed securities (MBS) that have residential mortgages as their 
underlying assets, and they invest directly in residential mortgage assets.  The latter investments are 
funded overwhelmingly by debt.  Table 1 shows their relative sizes and growth rates over the past 
three decades.  Their growth rates in the 1990s and in the early years of the current decade were 
especially breathtaking (although growth in 2004 slowed considerably for both companies).  As was 
mentioned in the Introduction, these rapid growth rates and their current very large sizes are major 
sources of the two companies' current prominent position in the public policy spotlight. 
 
A. Their special features and advantages. 
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are not ordinary corporations.  Though they are owned by 
shareholders and their shares of stock are traded on the New York Stock Exchange, they have an 
array of connections with the federal government that make them quite special: 
 - They were created by Acts of Congress and thus hold special federal charters (unlike 
virtually all other corporations, which hold charters granted by a state, often Delaware). 
 - The President of the United States can appoint 5 of the 18 board members of each 
company.2
 - The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to purchase up to $2.25 billion of each of their 
debt liabilities.3
                                                          
    2 In 2004 the Bush Administration ceased appointing those board members. 
    3 This is often paraphrased as their having a potential line of credit with the Treasury. 
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 - They are exempt from all state and local income taxes. 
 - They can use the Federal Reserve as their fiscal agent. 
 - Their debt is eligible for use as collateral for public deposits, for purchase by the Federal 
Reserve in open-market operations, and for unlimited investment by federally insured depository 
institutions (i.e., commercial banks and saving and loan associations [S&Ls or thrifts]). 
 - Their securities are exempt from the Securities and Exchange Commission's registration 
and reporting requirements and fees.4
 - Their securities are explicitly government securities under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934. 
 - Their securities are exempt from the provisions of many state investor protection laws. 
 - They are exempt from bankruptcy law, and no receivership provisions apply, so that in the 
event that they were to experience financial difficulties and could not satisfy all financial claims 
made upon them, only the Congress could resolve the situation. 
 
B. Some disadvantages. 
 The two companies are also subject to substantial restrictions: 
 - Their special charters restrict them to residential finance. 
 - They are explicitly forbidden to engage in mortgage origination. 
 - They are subject to a maximum size of mortgage (which is linked to an annual index of 
housing prices) that they can finance; i.e., a maximum value for a mortgage that can be the basis for 
issuing MBS or purchased for holding in their portfolios.  For 2005, that maximum (which is 
described as the "conforming loan" limit) is $359,650. 
                                                          
    4 In 2002, in an effort to quell criticism and fend off legislative action, the two companies 
"voluntarily" announced their intention to adhere to the SEC's reporting requirements.  Thus far, 
only Fannie Mae has actually registered its equity securities. 
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 - The mortgages that they finance must have at least a 20% down payment (i.e., a maximum 
loan-to-value ratio of 80%) or a credit enhancement (such as mortgage insurance). 
 - They are subject to safety-and-soundness regulation by the Office of Federal Housing 
Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), which is located within the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD). 
 - They are subject to "mission oversight" by HUD, which approves specific housing finance 
programs and sets social housing targets for the two companies. 
 
C. The immediate consequences
 The special features of the two companies have created an aura or "halo" around the two 
companies,5 often summarized in the phrase "government-sponsored enterprises" (GSEs) that is 
used to describe them and a few other organizations that embody similar perceptions of extensive 
federal government entanglements with a nominally private organization.6  Consequently, the 
financial markets have come to believe that the federal government would likely "bail out" the 
companies -- and thus their creditors -- in the event that either experienced financial difficulties -- 
even though their charters and each security that they issue state explicitly that these companies’ 
obligations are not obligations of the federal government. 
 Nevertheless, this perception of a likely bailout has persisted and has come to be called the 
belief in an "implicit guarantee."7  An immediate consequence is that the two companies are able to 
                                                          
    5 One important reflection -- and reinforcement -- of that halo is the way that financial information 
(e.g., current prices and yields) about the two companies' debt obligations are listed in financial 
publications.  The Wall Street Journal, for example, lists this information in a special box that is 
labeled "Government Agency & Special Issues" and that is often located next to its listings of 
Treasury debt obligations (and on a different page from its listings of corporate debt obligations). 
    6 Most notable among these other GSEs are the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system and the 
Farm Credit System. 
    7 Recent discussions by the credit rating agencies in justifying the AAA ratings that they have 
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borrow funds at rates that are better than those of corporations that are rated AAA, though not quite 
as good as the rates at which the U.S. Treasury borrows, even though the companies' ratings on a 
stand-alone basis (which would ignore the likely government support) would be only AA-.  This 
favorable borrowing possibility translates empirically into approximately a 35-40 basis point 
advantage on their direct corporate debt and about a 30 basis point advantage on their MBS 
issuances.  Since the two companies are highly leveraged -- supporting their assets plus MBS 
through 96-97% debt and only 3-4% equity -- the consequences of this borrowing advantage are 
substantial. 
 In turn, the companies pass most -- but not all -- of their borrowing advantages through to 
residential mortgage borrowers.  The interest rates on conforming loan mortgages are about 20-25 
basis points lower than the rates on otherwise similar "jumbo" mortgages that are above the size 
limit for conforming mortgages. 
 
D. Some additional consequences. 
 Because Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were able to operate nationally at a time when other 
mortgage lenders were geographically constrained, they were able historically to bring a greater 
degree of uniformity and stability to residential mortgage financial markets that otherwise would 
have been localized and disconnected.  Further, their size and stature may have been important in 
allowing them to serve as focal points for the adoption of standards with respect to technological 
advances in the processes of mortgage origination.  And though neither was the pioneer in the 
issuance of MBS -- that role was played by Ginnie Mae in 1970 -- Freddie Mac was a fast second in 
                                                                                                                                                             
assigned to the debt of the two companies have been explicit in their description of their belief in a 
high likelihood of a federal bailout and thus of an implicit guarantee.  This belief is supported by the 
history of the federal government's implicit forbearance when Fannie Mae was insolvent on a 
market-value basis in the late 1970s and early 1980s and the government's explicit bailout (with 
taxpayer funds) of another GSE, the Farm Credit System, in the late 1980s. 
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1971.  There is little question that the special GSE status of the two companies helped establish 
MBS as a worthwhile alternative financing channel alongside the more traditional channel of the 
portfolio lender.  
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 III.  The Problems
 
A. Housing Issues
 The encouragement for housing purchase and consumption that Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac provide are not an isolated policy foray.  Instead, these two companies and their effects are part 
of a far larger mosaic of policies at all levels of government to encourage greater construction and 
consumption of housing -- the most notable of which are the income tax treatment of mortgage 
interest and property taxes on personal residences8 and the exemption from capital gains taxes of all 
or most of the capital gains on residences. 
 There is a sound "positive externalities" argument for encouraging home ownership.  A 
home-owning household, as compared with a renter, is more likely to care about the upkeep of its 
home (with beneficial consequences for the neighbors) and to be more community-minded, with a 
longer-run perspective on such matters.  There is now a growing research literature that provides 
empirical support to what would otherwise be abstract theoretical arguments. 
 The ideal policy response to these positive externalities would be to have modest focused 
programs that would provide help -- in the form of subsidies on down payments and/or monthly 
payments -- to households that are on the cusp and would otherwise not be homeowners.  Likely 
candidates would be low- and moderate-income renter households who would thereby become first-
time buyers. 
 Though there has recently been a modest start on such a focused program,9 the 
                                                          
    8 I.e., these expenses can be deducted from gross reported income, but the implicit rent of an 
owner-occupier is not included in income. 
    9 This is the "American Dream Downpayment Act of 2003."  Also, there are long-standing 
programs of mortgage guarantees provided by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and the 
Veterans Administration (VA) (now the Department of Veterans Affairs), supported by 
securitization of these FHA and VA mortgages (since 1970) through the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (Ginnie Mae), which is an agency within HUD.  Since these mortgages have a 
  
 
 9
                                                                                                                                                            
overwhelming pattern of American encouragement for housing is of an extremely broad-brush 
nature (such as the tax advantages mentioned above) that lacks the focus just described and includes 
encouragement for rental housing (usually as part of an income-redistribution effort), which 
undercuts efforts to encourage home ownership.  This broad-brush encouragement means that 
households that would otherwise buy anyway are simply encouraged to buy larger and better 
appointed homes on larger lots.  Further, the most important encouragement for purchasing homes 
occurs through the form of deductions from reported income for income tax purposes (rather than in 
the form of refundable tax credits), which are more valuable to and more likely to be used by upper-
income households who are in higher tax brackets -- not the group that ought to be targeted so as to 
address the social externalities. 
 As a consequence of these broad-brush encouragements for the production and consumption 
of housing, the U.S. economy has invested excessively in housing and insufficiently in other forms 
of physical capital and in human capital. 
 The encouragement for home ownership that is provided through the special status of Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac is of this broad-brush nature.  The 20-25 basis point reduction in mortgage 
interest rates that is the consequence of these companies' activities mostly encourages households 
who would have purchased a home anyway to purchase a larger and better appointed one on a larger 
lot.10  Further, the conforming loan limit is far above the size of the mortgage that could be used to 
 
substantially lower qualifying ceiling than is true for the conforming loan limit that applies to Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, the FHA-VA-Ginnie Mae program has a greater focus on the homes that 
would be more likely to be bought be low- and moderate-income households, though there is no 
special emphasis on first-time buyers. 
    10 The reduction in mortgage interest rates is fundamentally a subsidy for borrowing.  Thus, a 
household can refinance a home with a larger mortgage (which is a frequent occurrence at times 
of falling interest rates) and thereby take greater advantage of the subsidy.  But such actions do 
not affect the rate of home ownership. 
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purchase the median price home in the U.S.11  For example, in 2003 the conforming loan limit was 
$322,700.  In that year, the median price of a new home that was sold in the U.S. was $195,000, and 
an 80% mortgage on that home would have been only $159,080.  Also in that year, the median price 
of an existing home that was sold in the U.S. was $170,000, and an 80% mortgage on that home 
would have been only $136,000. 
 As a consequence, the two companies' efforts are not focused on encouraging low- and 
moderate-income households to become first-time home buyers.  Despite HUD-set targets for such 
activity, which the companies have met, recent evidence gathered by HUD (in support of more 
ambitious targets) indicates that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have lagged the overall market in 
providing mortgage finance to this segment.12
 In sum, U.S. housing policy in general and Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's activities in 
specific have failed to focus on the true positive externalities from home ownership and have simply 
encouraged the construction and consumption of too much housing in the U.S. economy.  "Too 
much is never enough" is not a sensible basis for public policy. 
 
B. Safety and Soundness. 
 A recent policy focus has been on the safety-and-soundness regulation to which Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac are subject.  Since the financial markets believe that the federal government would 
bail out the two companies and since this belief seems likely to become reality in the event of the 
                                                          
    11 The conforming loan limit is 50% higher for homes purchased in Alaska, Hawaii, and the U.S. 
Virgin Islands, and it is higher for two-unit, three-unit, and four unit-residences (all of which are 
considered "single-family" homes) and for multi-family rental housing. 
    12 This evidence is part of the regulatory analysis underlying HUD's decision in November 2004 
to set more ambitious goals.  See http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/gse/gse.cfm.  The Bush 
Administration's federal budget documents for fiscal years 2005 and 2006 offer brief summaries of 
this evidence.  See USOMB (2004, 2005). 
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companies' financial difficulties,13 the federal government has a legitimate interest in trying to 
ensure the solvency of the two companies – although (ironically) the presence of effective safety-
and-soundness regulation may strengthen the financial market's perception that the federal 
government would bail out the two companies. 
 Only in 1992 did the federal government explicitly recognize this interest by creating 
OFHEO and empowering it with safety-and-soundness authority.14  Nevertheless, until it challenged 
Fannie Mae's accounting practices in September 2004, OFHEO was perceived politically as a weak 
regulatory agency with inadequate regulatory powers and weak political effectiveness in Congress 
(as compared with, for example, the bank regulatory agencies).15
 The Congress held hearings on regulatory reform in 2003 and 2004 but was unable to pass 
legislation that would be agreeable to the Bush Administration.16  The perceived weakened political 
    13 Though senior federal officials have (only in the past few years) begun denying the existence of 
any "implicit guaranty", they have yet to state explicitly that they would not bail out either company 
in the event of financial difficulties. 
    14 Calls for explicit safety-and-soundness regulation of the two GSEs had, of course, preceded 
the legislation that created OFHEO.  See, for example, Moe and Stanton (1989) and Stanton 
(1990, 1991). 
 
    15 For example, OFHEO took almost 10 years to establish and implement the risk-based capital 
requirements for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that were mandated in OFHEO’s enabling 1992 
legislation.  And, most important in the current environment, it lacks the authority to establish a 
receivership in the event of financial difficulties for either company, and it lacks the authority to 
modify the minimum capital requirements that apply to the two companies. 
    16 Besides issues of regulatory authority, including the crucial issue of receivership powers, other 
points of dispute have included whether the regulatory agency should stay in HUD; if not, whether it 
should be moved to the Treasury (and if so, how much direct oversight the Secretary of the Treasury 
would have over the agency) or whether it should be moved outside the executive branch entirely 
and established as a separate "independent" agency; whether the regulation of the FHLB system 
should be consolidated into whatever regulatory agency emerges or whether that system's regulator 
(the Federal Housing Finance Board) should remain intact; and how the agency should finance its 
activities. 
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positions of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (because of their respective accounting difficulties) have 
increased the likelihood that some measure of reform will be signed into law in 2005. 
 
C. Systemic risk. 
 The large sizes of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, their focus on a narrow class (residential 
mortgage) of assets, their relative importance in the area of residential mortgages, and their relatively 
high leverage and relatively low capital levels (3-4% of assets) has recently generated a debate 
concerning systemic risk -- i.e., the consequences for the rest of the economy if either of them were 
to experience financial difficulties. 
 These concerns extend beyond just the losses that the two companies' creditors would 
experience in the event of the two companies' financial difficulties.  Rather, systemic risk issues 
focus on one or both of the following: (1) a fear that there would be a cascading effect because the 
losses experienced by the companies' creditors would be so severe as to cause those companies to 
become bankrupt or insolvent, in turn causing further waves of financial losses and failures; or (2) a 
fear that the financial difficulties of either company could substantially affect the residential 
mortgage markets, with further adverse consequences for home buyers and sellers, realtors, home 
builders, etc. 
 The issue of systemic risk is linked inexorably to the issue of safety and soundness.  
Systemic risk is one potential justification for safety-and-soundness regulation.17  To the extent that 
safety-and-soundness regulation is adequately ensuring the solvency of the regulated institutions, 
systemic risk concerns should be diminished. 
 It is no accident, then, that the systemic risk issues with respect to Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac arose at roughly the same time as the concerns about the inadequacy of OFHEO's safety-and-
                                                          
    17 It has been one of the traditional justifications for the safety-and-soundness regulation of 
depository institutions. 
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soundness regulation of the two companies.  And, if the safety-and-soundness issues outlined above 
are adequately addressed in legislation, the systemic risk concerns that surround the two companies 
should similarly diminish. 
 Nevertheless, because safety-and-soundness regulation will never be perfect, and because 
there are only the two large and prominent GSEs at the center of the secondary mortgage finance 
system, some systemic risk concerns are likely to persist. 
 
D. The absence of prepay penalties and the bearing of interest-rate risk. 
 The standard residential mortgage in the U.S. is a 30-year fixed-rate debt instrument on 
which the borrower can prepay at any time with no penalty.  The absence of an explicitly priced 
prepay option for the borrower means that the lender bears all of the interest-rate risk of these 
instruments.  This additional risk for the lender causes mortgage interest rates to be higher than if a 
prepay option were explicitly priced.  There is a resulting net benefit for those who do indeed prepay 
their mortgages (e.g., who refinance them when interest rates fall below the levels that prevailed 
when the original mortgage was issued) and a net cost for those who do not prepay; in essence, the 
latter are cross-subsidizing the former. 
 Why don't the mortgage markets offer borrowers the choice of a lower interest rate if they 
accept a prepay penalty or a higher interest rate if they want the "free" prepay option?  A patchwork 
of laws that forbid prepay penalties in some states seems to be part of the answer.  But another part 
seems to be the policies of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, who generally buy or securitize only 
mortgages that do not have prepay penalties. 
 
E. Possible efficiencies or inefficiencies. 
 Because of the two companies' special status and favorable borrowing rates, it is extremely 
difficult to determine how much of their current size and prominence (or of any proposed horizontal 
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or vertical expansionary initiative) is due to the inherent efficiencies of their portfolio and MBS 
operations and how much is due to that special status and those favorable borrowing rates.  Without 
a "clean" market test, a definitive answer is likely never to be known. 
 
F. A summing up. 
 The U.S. economy has too much of the wrong kind of housing and not enough of the right 
kind of home ownership.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have generally been part of that problem 
rather than part of the solution.  Further, their large sizes and the financial markets' belief in the 
implicit guarantee have heightened worries about the effectiveness of OFHEO's safety-and-
soundness regulation of the two companies and a set of concomitant concerns about their systemic 
risk.  Finally, so long as they retain their special status and advantages, we will never know how 
much of what they do is based on true efficiency and how much is based on their special advantages. 
 Any principled examination of public intervention into otherwise functioning markets must 
ask whether there is a substantial market failure -- e.g., a problem of monopoly, or of 
externalities/spillovers, or of asymmetric information -- that is being addressed in a direct and 
effective way and/or a sensible effort at income redistribution.  By either of these standards, the 
current federal intervention in residential mortgage markets through the special status of Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac falls far short. 
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 IV. True Privatization as the Solution, and How to Do It
 
A. True privatization as the solution. 
 As was discussed in Section II, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are nominally "private" 
companies.  But as that Section also described, they embody an array of special features that cause 
them better to be described as GSEs rather than as purely private entities.  And, as Section III 
discussed, their GSE status creates or contributes to an array of serious problems. 
 Though regulatory reform is currently the topic for policy debate, such reform is, at best, a 
second-best solution.  Instead, true privatization of the two companies18 -- i.e., the withdrawal of 
their special Congressional charters and all of the special features that go with those charters -- is the 
best solution.19  Figuratively, public policy should shake the hands and pat the backs of the senior 
managements of the two companies (and their predecessors for the past three decades), praise them 
and tell them "job well done" (for helping bring about the securitization revolution), and point them 
toward the Delaware Secretary of State's office in Dover for their new corporate charters.  The goal 
would not be to destroy or remove the companies from the marketplace but instead to allow them to 
compete in the marketplace on their own true merits (and without their special quasi-governmental 
status and advantages).20
 Faced with the withdrawal of their special federal charters, the two companies would indeed 
                                                          
    18 It is interesting to note that the legislation that created OFHEO in 1992 also called for a set 
of studies on privatizing the GSEs, which were eventually published in 1996.  See USHUD 
(1996). 
 
    19 As a related policy matter, if Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are truly privatized, then the FHLB 
system also should be truly privatized. 
    20 Arguably, some of their current systems and organizational efficiencies were developed 
with the help of their special advantages of the past.  Nevertheless, any effort to try to recapture 
these advantages would be an unnecessary diversion from the important goal of removing their 
special advantages going-forward and would risk the elimination of real efficiencies. 
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likely seek Delaware charters and hope to become "garden-variety" Delaware companies -- albeit 
initially quite big ones but also, importantly, subject to "garden-variety" bankruptcy laws.  To the 
greatest extent possible they should be allowed to do so.  At the Congressional hearings that would 
precede the passage of any privatization legislation, the Secretary of the Treasury should loudly 
proclaim that (after privatization) the Treasury will treat the two companies no differently than it 
does other corporations in the U.S. economy and would trust to the bankruptcy courts to deal with 
any financial difficulties.  Similarly, the President should reiterate that message at the official 
signing of the legislation. 
 Along with the withdrawal of their special Congressional charters and attendant features 
ought to be the withdrawal of safety-and-soundness regulation of the two companies and of any 
special HUD oversight or Community Reinvestment Act-like requirements.  Market forces, 
supplemented by explicit federal subsidies to low- and moderate-income households who are first-
time home buyers, should prevail. 
 Although the financial markets might initially believe that the two companies' large sizes 
would mean that the companies were "too big to fail" (i.e., that in the event of financial difficulties 
the federal government would bail them out anyway), the markets would surely be less certain of 
this position than they currently are with respect to the implicit guarantee.21  The borrowing costs of 
the two companies would rise -- perhaps by as much as the 40 basis point differential that 
accompanies current beliefs.22  With a smaller cost advantage, their presence in the conforming 
    21 Also, recall that one of the current special features and advantages of Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac is that banks and S&Ls can hold unlimited quantities of their debt obligations, without running 
afoul of the stringent regulatory limits on "loans to one borrower" that apply to all other private 
borrowers.  With true privatization, banks and thrifts should be able to hold near-unlimited quantities 
of their MBS (and any other issuer's MBS, so long as it is clear that the banks' and thrifts' ultimate 
claims are on the underlying borrowers), but the straight debt of the two GSEs should be subject to 
the loans-to-one-borrower limits, as is true for the debt of any other company that can be held by a 
bank or a thrift. 
    22 Alternatively, they would have to raise more (costly) capital to reassure their creditors that the 
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residential mortgage segment -- as investors and as securitizers -- would surely diminish.  But also, 
without the conforming loan limit and the statutory 20% down payment, they would be free to enter 
jumbo lending and sub-prime mortgages, as well as other areas of consumer finance where their 
lending expertise might be valued.  But now there would be a market test for their presence.  And the 
size and variety of the other market participants would make it unlikely that "predatory" behavior (in 
the antitrust sense of initially cutting prices below marginal costs, in the hopes of gaining an 
eventual monopoly) would be worthwhile or attempted.  It is this author's guess that the net effect 
would be a shrinkage in the asset sizes of the two companies. 
 With the increase in their borrowing costs, it is likely that the interest rates on conforming 
residential mortgages would increase -- by perhaps as much as 25 basis points.  This would be a 
relatively modest increase -- one that (in nominal terms) the mortgage markets accommodate 
frequently.  Grass would not grow in the streets of America; and grass would continue to grow in the 
(slightly more modest-sized) backyards of America.  Such an increase would be all to the good, as it 
would reduce the overall level of the broad-brush subsidy provided to housing.  In place of the 
GSEs' special status, the federal government should expand its on-budget programs to encourage 
home ownership by low- and moderate-income households. 
 If the two companies' sizes do shrink after they become Delaware corporations, concerns 
about "too big to fail", their systemic risk,23 and the concomitant need for safety-and-soundness 
regulation would diminish.  Further, their diminished role in the mortgage markets would increase 
the likelihood that the prepay option would be priced explicitly.  Finally, with the implicit guarantee 
gone, their activities in any sector would meet a market test. 
 
two companies' relatively low borrowing rates were justified; or some combination of higher capital 
levels and higher borrowing costs. 
    23 Also, since depositories tend to be highly leveraged, as their holdings of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac straight debt securities diminish, concerns about cascading effects should diminish. 
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 In sum, true privatization would address all of the concerns raised in Section III. 
 
B. How to do it. 
 The best way to achieve true privatization is to follow the Nike Corporation's admonition: 
Just do it! 
 This change of policy would most directly affect those who bought Fannie Mae's and 
Freddie Mac's securities believing in the "implicit guarantee".  Public policy owes such purchasers 
no special favors and no special transition, since they have been warned explicitly that the GSEs' 
obligations were not those of the federal government and nevertheless have chosen to ignore that 
information.  Indeed, to establish special transition rules24 would be to reward those who ignored the 
warnings -- roughly similar to rewarding those who build houses on flood plains, despite warnings 
not to do so, and who are then bailed out by Congress. 
 But what of potential sharp disruptions to the residential mortgage market?  The simple 
answer is that there are unlikely to be sharp disruptions.  First, the magnitude of the changes in the 
prices of the companies' outstanding debt are unlikely to be large.  Recall that the two companies' 
special borrowing advantage is about 40 basis points.  The removal of their special status would 
cause the financial markets to discount the expected payment streams on their existing debt by (at 
most) an additional amount that would equal those same 40 basis points.  This change is well within 
the kinds of fluctuations that the financial markets deal with frequently.  For example, for a 10-year 
5% straight bond, a 40 basis point increase in the discount rate that is applied to the bond's payment 
stream would mean a decline in the bond's price by approximately 3%.  More generally, if the 
average duration of the liabilities of the two companies is about 5 years and their average interest 
                                                          
    24 As was done for the privatization of Sallie Mae (see Dean, Moskowitz, and Cipriani [1999] and 
Overend [2001]) and as has been advocated for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac by Ely (2004) and 
Wallison, Stanton, and Ely (2004). 
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expense on those liabilities is 4%, the average price decline over all of those liabilities would be 
about 2%. 
 Second, and at least as important, the privatization process would not be the equivalent of a 
sudden bankruptcy filing.  Any changes -- small or large -- in prices in the mortgage markets would 
be gradual and transitional.  After all, any privatization would occur in a highly political 
environment and would not be sprung on the markets overnight. 
 One possible scenario would unfold as follows:  The administration would announce its 
intentions to seek true privatization legislation -- or, perhaps, announce its intentions to appoint a 
task force to recommend legislation.  Subsequently, legislation would be introduced in Congress.  
Congressional hearings would be held.  Majority votes of both houses of Congress would eventually 
occur, and the President would then sign the legislation.  Progress would thus be incremental, with 
the market participants gradually adjusting their estimates of the likelihood that true privatization 
would prevail.  The prices of the two companies' securities would change incrementally, with 
relatively small losses or gains occurring at any point in time. 
 
C. Second-best. 
 Despite its superiority in dealing with the real problems raised by the special status of Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac and its straightforward simplicity, true privatization is an unlikely prospect for 
the immediate future.  Their recent accounting stumbles notwithstanding, Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac and their roles in broadly encouraging housing construction and consumption still enjoy 
widespread political support on Capitol Hill. 
 Consequently, second-best policies must be considered.  These should consist of: improved 
safety-and-soundness regulation (which must, at its heart, embody a market-value accounting 
framework), enforced by a regulatory agency that is lodged in the Treasury and that has receivership 
powers; the adoption by bank and S&L regulators of the standard loans-to-one-borrower limits on 
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the two GSEs' straight debt obligations; the freezing of the conforming loan limit at its current level 
of $359,650, which would force the two companies gradually to focus more of their efforts on the 
lower end of the market, where the positive social externalities of home ownership are the 
strongest;25 the maintenance of HUD's pressure on the two companies to focus more of their efforts 
on the lower end of the market; and the repeated statements by the Secretary of the Treasury and 
other senior officials of every administration that the federal government means what it says on 
every GSE security and that they have no intention of ever "bailing out" either company or its 
creditors. 
    25 A freeze of the conforming loan value is a far superior method for limiting their size and 
growth, as compared to a simple cap on their assets or on their borrowing.  A freeze would gradually 
but directly force them to focus on the lower end of the mortgage market, where the positive social 
externalities are the greatest.  A cap on their size (assets or borrowing) would instead cause them to 
focus more on the upper end of the mortgage market, where their margins (for any given size) would 
likely be higher, unless HUD's “mission regulation” forces them farther into the lower end. 
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 V. Conclusion. 
 
 The case for a true privatization of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is overwhelming.  The 
method is straightforward.  The time is now.  Just do it. 
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Table 1: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Assets and Mortgage-Backed Securities and the Residential 
Mortgage Market, 1971-2004
 (in billions of dollars) 
 
Fannie Mae Freddie Mac  
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
Total 
assets 
 
Retained 
mortgage 
portfolioa
Mortgage-
backed 
securities 
outstandingb
 
 
Total 
assets 
 
Retained 
mortgage 
portfolioa
Mortgage-
backed 
securities 
outstandingb
Total 
nonfarm, 
residential 
mortgages 
1971 $18.6 $17.9 $0.0 $1.0 $1.0 $0.1 $391
    
1975 31.6 30.8 0.0 5.9 4.9 1.6 578
    
1980 57.9  55.6  0.0 5.5 5.0 17.0  1,105
    
1985 99.1 94.1 54.6 16.6 13.5 99.9 1,729
    
1990 133.1 114.1 288.1 40.6 21.5 316.4 2,907
    
1995 316.6 252.9 513.2 137.2 107.7 459.0 3,743
    
2000 675.2 607.7 706.7 459.3 385.5 576.1 5,532
    
2001 799.9 706.8 859.0 641.1 503.8 653.1 6,083
    
2002 887.5 801.1 1,029.5 752.2 589.9 749.3 6,896
    
2003 1,009.6 901.9 1,300.2 803.4 660.4 768.9 7,662
    
2004 n.a. 904.6 1,402.8 795.2 664.5 852.0 8,672
 
a Includes repurchased mortgage-backed securities. 
b Excludes mortgage-backed securities that are held in portfolio 
 
Sources: OFHEO; Federal Reserve; Fannie Mae; Freddie Mac 
